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WHAT'S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?
THE PROTECTION OF ABORIGINAL
TITLE IN CANADA©
BY PATRICK MACKLEM*

This essay presents and contrasts two narratives on the
past and future of the law of Aboriginal title. Thefirst
narrative, drawn from the Final Report of the Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, grounds the law of
Aboriginal title in inter-societal norms that enabled the
mutual coexistence of colonists and settlers in North
America. It locates Aboriginal territorial dispossession
in colonial policies and practices that failed to conform
to the spirit of mutual coexistence, and calls on
governments to provide Aboriginal people with lands
and resources necessary for self-sufficiency. The
counter-narrative describes the law of Aboriginal title
as a relatively minor exception to a more general legal
legacy of Aboriginal territorial dispossession. It argues
that the law should acknowledge that it has produced
unjust distributions of title in Canada. It calls on the
law of Aboriginal title to allocate proprietary power to
Aboriginal people in ways that force governments to
introduce reforms similar to those recommended by the
Royal Commission.

Cet essai prcsente et met en contraste deux histoires
concemant le pass6 et l'avenir du droit relatifaux titres
aborigine. La premibre histoire, tirde du Rapport de la
Commission Royale sur les peuples autochtones, 6tablie
les bases de ce droit dans le contexte de normes entersocietd permettant la coexistence mutuelle des
colonisateurs et des colons en Amdrique du Nord.
Cette histoire affirme que la d~possession territoriale
autochtone ddcoule des politiques et des pratiques
coloniales n'ayant su se conformer i l'esprit de
coexistence mutuelle, et demande au gouvernements
d'accorder aux peuples autochtones les terres et les
resources ndcessaires afin d'assurer leur autosuffisance.
La seconde histoire, contredisant le premiere, d~crit le
droit relatif aux titres aborigine comme une exception
relativement mineure h la longue tradition I6gale de la
depossession territoriale autochtones. Cette histoire
soutient que le droit devrait reconnaitre qu'il a
contribu6 Ala distribution injuste des titres au Canada.
Elle suggbre que le droit relatif aux titre aborigine
accorde des pouvoirs de proprit6 aux peuples
autochtones en vue de forcer les gouvernements 4
introduire des rdformes similaires 5 celles
recommand.es par la Commission Royale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay presents two narratives concerning the role of law in
relation to the protection of Aboriginal title in Canada. The first is
contained in the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples.1 The second-which, for want of a better term, I will call the
counter-narrative-complements the first but emphasizes different
aspects of law's past and future.
The question that forms the title of this essay refers to a solution,
proposed by the Commission, to problems that Aboriginal people face as
a result of historic dispossession of their ancestral territories. In its
Report, the Commission calls for a new deal for Aboriginal people:
It is not difficult to identify the solution. Aboriginal nations need much more territory to
become economically, culturally and politically self-sufficient. If they cannot obtain a
greater share of the lands and resources in this country, their institutions of
self-government will fail. Without adequate lands and resources, Aboriginal nations will
be unable to build their communities and structure the employment opportunities
necessary to achieve self-sufficiency. Currently on the margins of Canadian society, they
will be pushed to the edge of economic, cultural and political extinction. The government
must act forcefully, generously and swiftly to insure the economic, cultural and political
survival of Aboriginal nations.2

Exploring law's relation to this solution-what law has to do with
it-involves two related inquiries: (a) why does the law not already
provide Aboriginal nations with sufficient land and resources? and (b)
what should the law do in the future to provide Aboriginal nations with
sufficient land and resources? By law, I refer to law promulgated by the
judiciary, not legislative initiatives. As will be seen, the two narratives
respond to these inquiries in divergent ways.
II. THE COMMISSION'S NARRATIVE3

Why does the law not already provide Aboriginal nations with
sufficient land and resources? The answer to this question lies in
history. If we go back in time, we see that despite claims of territorial

1 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report: Restructuring the Relationship,
vol. 2, Part II (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1996) [hereinafter Restructuring the
Relationship].
2 Ibid. at 557.
3 This section condenses the Commission's discussion of the law of Aboriginal title and its
recommendations concerning lands and resources: see ibid at 559-68 and 1021-22.
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sovereignty to North America by European nation-states at the time of
contact, Aboriginal relationships to land and its resources were initially
respected by imperial and colonial authorities. Indeed, the law of
Aboriginal title, as initially expressed in British colonial law, emerged
out of the very process of colonization and settlement-through the
practices of Aboriginal people and colonial officials in their attempt to
maintain peace and cooperation with each other.
The law of Aboriginal title quickly grew to reflect inter-societal
norms that enabled the mutual coexistence of colonists and Aboriginal
people on the North American continent. This body of law prescribes
stable ways of handling disputes between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
people, especially disputes over land. It recognizes Aboriginal title,
namely, Aboriginal occupation and use of ancestral lands, including
territory where Aboriginal people hunted, fished, trapped, and gathered
food, not just territory where there were Aboriginal village sites or
cultivated fields. It purports to restrict non-Aboriginal settlement on
Aboriginal territory until the Aboriginal interest in such territory has
been surrendered to the Crown. It prohibits sales of Aboriginal land to
non-Aboriginal people without the approval and participation by Crown
authorities. And, in its most developed form, it prescribes safeguards for
the manner in which such surrenders can occur and imposes strict
fiduciary obligations on the Crown with respect to Aboriginal lands and
resources.
Although the law from the outset recognized a range of inherent
rights with respect to land and resources, Crown respect for the
existence of Aboriginal title was most consistent during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. This respect was eroded by the decline
of the fur trade and the ensuing decline of Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal economic interdependence. Increased demands on
Aboriginal territory occasioned by population growth and westward
expansion, followed by a period of paternalistic administration marked
by involuntary relocations, only exacerbated the erosion of respect. The
treaty-making process fell into disuse, and treaties that had been
concluded were often vulnerable to charges of manipulation and
misinterpretation by government officials. Judicial doubts came to be
expressed as to the existence and nature of Aboriginal title.4 Courts
began to view treaties between Aboriginal nations and the Crown as at
best private contracts, ignoring their historic and fundamental

4 See, for example, St. Catherine'sMillingv. R. (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St.
Catherine'sMilling]; and Re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 (P.C.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 35 NO. I

characterS The law of Aboriginal title fell into disuse. It was
misunderstood by legal and political actors and increasingly ignored by
the governments of the day. As a result, it failed to protect Aboriginal
lands and resources against non-Aboriginal settlement and exploitation.
What should the law do to provide Aboriginal nations with
sufficient land and resources? The Commission noted that the judiciary
has begun to develop the law of Aboriginal title along its original
trajectory of respect and co-existence. The Supreme Court of Canada
has affirmed that Canadian law recognizes Aboriginal title as
encompassing a range of rights of use and enjoyment of ancestral land
stemming not from any legal enactment such as the Royal Proclamation6
but instead from the fact of Aboriginal occupancy. 7 The Court has also
held that the Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Aboriginal people in its
dealings with Aboriginal lands and resources. 8 In another case, the
Court has ruled that treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal nations
ought to be construed in light of their historic character and "not
according to the technical meaning of their words, but in the sense that
they would naturally be understood by the Indians." 9 And, in 1990, in
light of constitutional recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal
and treaty rights by section 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,10 the
Court ruled that:
[t]he relationship between the' Government and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be
11
defined in light of this historic relationship."

Thus, the law of Aboriginal title provides a strong foundation for
contemporary protection of Aboriginal lands and resources. Indeed, the
law requires the Crown to take active steps to protect Aboriginal lands
and resources. This positive dimension of the law emerges from the text,
structure, and jurisprudence of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which cumulatively suggest that governmental action-in the form of

5 See, for example, Pawisv. R., [1980] 2 F.C. 18 (T.D.).
6 1763 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App II, No. 1 [hereinafter Royal Proclamation].
7 Calderv. Brtish Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313.

8 Guerin v. R., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
9 Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 402, quoting Gray J. in Jones v. Meehan 175 U.S. 1 at 11
(1899).
10 Being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K:), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Constitution Act,
1982].
11 Sparrowv. R., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1108.
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negotiations-is central to the constitutional recognition and affirmation
of Aboriginal and treaty rights. It also is reflected in case law addressing
the Crown's fiduciary relationship with Aboriginal people, which
emphasizes the responsibility of government to protect Aboriginal rights
arising from the special trust relationship created by history, treaties,
and legislation. And it is supported by emerging international legal
norms, which impose extensive positive obligations on governments to
recognize and protect a wide array of rights with respect to lands and
resources.
But beyond providing a foundation for the protection of
Aboriginal title, the Commission is of the view that governments, not the
law, should provide Aboriginal nations with greater lands and resources.
Though true to the original purposes of the law of Aboriginal title,
current jurisprudence cannot and does not accomplish all that is
required to protect Aboriginal lands and resources.
Why? According to the Commission, when an Aboriginal nation
asserts a particular right associated with title to engage in a relatively
discrete activity, such as fishing, a ruling that defines the respective
rights of the parties may well be an effective means of resolving the
issue. However, when an Aboriginal nation asserts a wide range of
rights with respect to lands and resources associated with title, the
courtroom is not always the most effective forum to settle the dispute.
Available remedies are often too blunt and reactive to reflect the
detailed and complex political, economic, jurisdictional, and remedial
judgments necessary to resolve the claim to the satisfaction of all
interested stakeholders. These conditioning factors make the law but
one part of a larger political process of negotiation and reconciliation.
Even if the law could tailor its rules and remedies to address
these issues in a detailed manner, negotiations are clearly preferable to
court-imposed solutions. Litigation is expensive and time-consuming.
Negotiation permits parties to address each other's real needs and reach
complex and mutually agreeable trade-offs. A negotiated agreement is
more likely to achieve legitimacy than a court-ordered solution, if only
because the parties participated more directly and constructively in its
creation. And negotiation mirrors the nation-to-nation relationship that
underpins the law of Aboriginal title and structures relations between
Aboriginal nations and the Crown.
With respect to short-term protection, the Commission urges the
judiciary to make creative use of the interlocutory injunction to facilitate
negotiations, but it calls on governments to ease the judiciary's burden
by providing an alternative, and more flexible and effective, form of
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interim relief tailored to the particular needs and interests of all relevant
stakeholders.
Specifically, the Commission calls on federal and provincial
governments to recognize, in a Canada-wide framework agreement, the
critical role of interim relief agreements, and to agree on principles and
procedures to govern such agreements, including: (a) the partial
withdrawal of lands that are the subject of claims in a specific claims
treaty process; (b) Aboriginal participation and consent in the use or
development of withdrawn lands; and (c) revenues from royalties or
taxation of resource developments on the withdrawn lands to be held in
trust pending the outcome of negotiation. Companion legislation to a
proposed Royal Proclamation should state that the parties have a duty
to make reasonable efforts to reach an interim relief agreement.
The Commission also urges the federal government to enter into
an interim specific claims protocol with the Assembly of First Nations.
The purpose of such a protocol would be to expand the scope of current
specific claims policy to include treaty-based claims, enhance the
definition of lawful obligation and compensation principles, obligate the
federal government to attempt to provide equivalent land in
compensation where a claim relates to the loss of land, and provide
greater federal funding to expedite claims resolution.
The Commission also foresees a new Lands and Treaties
Tribunal to supervise the negotiation, implementation, and conclusion
of interim relief agreements. The tribunal would possess the power to
impose interim relief agreements in the event of a breach of the duty to
bargain in good faith, and to grant interim relief pending successful
negotiations of a new or renewed treaty with respect to federal lands and
provincial lands where provincial powers have been so delegated.
In the Commission's view, the law also ought to take a back seat
to governmental action in the long term. For the reasons given
elsewhere in the Commission's Report, current federal policy respecting
comprehensive and specific claims fails to provide the necessary
protection to Aboriginal people.) 2 The failure of current policy forces
Aboriginal nations to seek to enforce their rights in the courts, which, for
the reasons stated, cannot provide the ongoing supervision required to
enforce lasting solutions to disputes involving competing claims to lands
and resources.
The Commission calls on governments to establish new treatymaking and treaty-renewal policies and processes to provide Aboriginal
nations with greater ownership and control of lands and resources.
12

Restructuringthe Relationship, supra note 1, at 527-56.
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Specifically, it calls on federal, provincial, and territorial governments,
through negotiation guided by an extensive set of principles identified by
the Commission, to provide Aboriginal nations with lands that are
sufficient in size and quality to foster Aboriginal self-reliance and
cultural and political autonomy. Such negotiations should aim to divide
the territory in question into three categories of land, in order to identify
as precisely as possible the rights of each party with respect to lands,
resources, and governance.
Category I lands would be lands in relation to which Aboriginal
nations would have full rights of ownership and primary jurisdiction.
They would include existing reserve and settlement land as well as
additional lands necessary to foster self-sufficiency, and the Aboriginal
nation would exercise primary and paramount legislative authority in
relation to such lands. As a general rule, fee simple lands would not be
converted into Category I lands unless purchased from willing sellers;
but in exceptional cases, where the Aboriginal nation's interests clearly
outweigh the third party's interests, such as where the land was
unlawfully or fraudulently obtained in the past or where it is of
outstanding traditional significance, the Crown could expropriate at fair
market value. Lands on which there are third-party interests less than
fee simple can be included in Category I, but the Aboriginal nation is to
respect all terms of such tenures; again, in exceptional circumstances,
such terms can be revoked by the Crown at fair market value. Existing
parks and protected areas generally should not be selected as category I
lands.
Category II lands would form a portion of the traditional
territory of the nation, that portion determined by the degree to which
Category I lands foster Aboriginal self-reliance. A number of Aboriginal
and Crown rights with respect to lands and resources would be
recognized by the agreement, and rights of governance and jurisdiction
would be shared among the parties. Fee simple lands and lands
burdened by interests less than fee could be included in Category II.
Category III lands would involve a complete set of Crown rights
with respect to lands and governance, subject to residual Aboriginal
rights of access to historical and sacred sites and hunting and fishing
grounds. The Aboriginal nation would exercise limited, negotiated
authority in respect of the Aboriginal citizens living on Category III
lands.
Finally, as alluded to earlier, the Commission also calls for the
establishment of an Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunal. In addition
to its supervisory functions in relation to interim relief, the tribunal
would deal with specific claims by monitoring the adequacy of federal
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funding and the good faith of bargaining and adjudicating claims
referred to it by Aboriginal claimants. The tribunal would also play a
role in the treaty-making, treaty-implementation, and treaty-renewal
processes by reviewing the adequacy of federal funding to Aboriginal
parties; arbitrating any issues referred to it by the parties by mutual
consent; monitoring the good faith of the bargaining process;
adjudicating, on request of an Aboriginal party, questions of any
Aboriginal or treaty rights that are related to negotiations and justiciable
in a court of law; investigating complaints of noncompliance with treaty
undertakings, adjudicating disputes and awarding an appropriate remedy
when so empowered by the treaty parties; and recommending to the
federal government, through panels established for the purpose, whether
a group asserting the right of self-governance should be recognized as an
Aboriginal nation.
In sum, according to the Commission's narrative, the law of
Aboriginal title exists as a backdrop to complex nation-to-nation
negotiations concerning ownership, jurisdiction, and co-management.
By recognizing Aboriginal title, the law serves as an instrument for the
enforcement of Aboriginal rights and provides Aboriginal nations with a
measure of bargaining power during negotiations. But the law cannot
and should not do much more than lay down general principles that can
act as baselines from which parties commence negotiations. Such legal
principles may, on occasion, require governmental action, but it is
governmental, not legal, action that is required to provide additional
lands and resources to Aboriginal nations. According to this narrative,
action must occur in the political realm. The law remains in the
shadows, a relatively abstract articulation of the ideal of mutual
co-existence.
III. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE
To explain why the law does not already provide Aboriginal
nations with sufficient land and resources, the counter-narrative also
goes back in time, to the period of initial colonial contact and expansion
in the new world. During this period, it was accepted practice among
European nations that the first among them to discover vacant land
acquired sovereignty over that land, to the exclusion of other future
claimants. In the case of populated land, sovereignty was acquired by
the discovering nation not by simple settlement, but by conquest or
cession, but such land could be deemed vacant if its inhabitants were
insufficiently Christian. The law deemed North America to be vacant,
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and territorial sovereignty was acquired by European powers through
the mere acts of discovery and settlement.
One expression and consequence of the sovereign power of the
Canadian state is that Aboriginal territorial interests are governed by
Canadian property law. Based on the legal fiction that the Crown was
the original occupant of all the lands of the realm, Canadian property
law holds that the Crown enjoys underlying title to all of Canada.
Property owners possess and own their land as a result of grants from
the Crown. Ownership confers a right to use and enjoy the land in
question and a right to exclude others from entering onto one's land.
The fiction of original Crown occupancy was originally
developed to legitimate feudal landholdings in England, along with
another fiction that actual occupants of land at the time enjoyed rights
of ownership as a result of grants from the Crown. Since the law had
imagined the Crown as granting lands to landholders, the Crown was no
longer the full owner of granted land. Ownership, or fee simple, passed
as a result of these grants to landholders. This was not true in fact: the
Crown was not the original occupant and therefore owner of the land.
At the outset too, there were not, by and large, actual grants effected by
the Crown to landholders. These were fictions developed to rationalize
the existing pattern of landholdings in England, and they served this
purpose well.
The fiction of underlying Crown title had different consequences
in the colonial context. While, in England, underlying Crown title was
accompanied by legal recognition of initially fictional grants to actual
occupants, thereby having the effect of legitimating the existing pattern
of landholdings, only one half of this equation was imported to Canada,
thereby severely disrupting the existing pattern of landholdings in
Canada. The Crown was imagined as the original occupant of all of
Canada, but actual occupants were not recognized as owning their land
through fictional Crown grants. Because the law posited the Crown as
the original occupant but did not imagine the Crown to have granted
title to Aboriginal occupants, the Crown was free to grant third-party
interests to whomever it pleased, which it did: to settlers, mining
By refusing* to
companies, forestry companies, and the like.
acknowledge the full legal significance of Aboriginal occupancy,
Canadian property law vested and continues to vest extraordinary
proprietary power in the Crown. When coupled with its legislative
power, the Crown's proprietary authority authorizes a vast array of
competing claims to ancestral territories.
The law of Aboriginal title forms a small exception to Canadian
law's general unwillingness to acknowledge Aboriginal legal interests
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with respect to ancestral territories. It provides that, under certain
circumstances, Aboriginal nations can claim rights of possession and use
of remnants of ancestral territory, subject to surrender to or
extinguishment by the Canadian state. But it also assumes that:
there has been all along vested in the Crown a substantial and paramount estate,
underlying the Indian title, which became a plenum dominium whenever that title was
13
surrendered or otherwise extinguished.

And the burden that Aboriginal title placed on the Crown's underlying
interest has never meaningfully checked the exercise of Crown
proprietary power, let alone the exercise of the Crown's legislative
authority. As a result, Aboriginal title exists at the margins, meaningful
only in geographic spaces left vacant by Crown or third-party non-use.
In response to the question of why the law does not already
provide Aboriginal nations with sufficient lands and resources, this
narrative suggests that law performed precisely the opposite function:
namely, Aboriginal territorial dispossession. Indeed, law was
instrumental in legitimating colonization and imperial expansion in two
key respects. The law accepted the legitimacy of assertions of Crown
sovereignty, thereby excluding or at least containing Canadian legal
expression of Aboriginal sovereignty. And the law accepted the
legitimacy of assertions of underlying Crown title, thereby excluding or
at least containing Canadian legal expression of Aboriginal territorial
interests.
With respect to the second inquiry-namely, what should the law
do in the future to provide Aboriginal nations with sufficient lands and
resources-the counter-narrative suggests that Canadian law must come
to terms with the fact that it has been complicit in the colonization of
Aboriginal people. Law's complicity in colonization specifically lies in its
initial and continuing acceptance of undifferentiated Crown assertions
of sovereignty and underlying title. Legal acceptance of such claims
produced and continues to produce distributions of legislative and
proprietary authority that severely disadvantage, in fact and law,
Aboriginal nations in their efforts to achieve self-sufficiency. The law
must acknowledge that colonization is an issue of distributive justice,
and that its distributions of legislative and proprietary power, premised
as they are on Aboriginal exclusion, are unjust.
Land claims negotiations illustrate the distributive function of
the law of Aboriginal title. When the Crown and an Aboriginal nation
negotiate the terms of a land claims agreement, each commences
13

St. Catherine'sMilling, supranote 4 at 55.
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negotiations armed with a certain amount of bargaining power which it
exercises with an eye to wresting concessions from the other. Much
criticism has been levelled against the process that the federal
government has put in place to structure and regulate negotiations; the
comprehensive and specific land claims processes suffer from a number
of structural and institutional flaws that render them ineffectual
instruments for achieving mutual coexistence.1 4 Yet, even if the parties
were to agree on procedurally fair processes for the resolution of
comprehensive and specific claims, such procedural reform would not
address the real problem, which is the dramatic inequality of bargaining
power that exists between the parties.
The key point of the counter-narrative is that the relative
bargaining power of the parties is a function of the distribution of
property rights accomplished by legal choice. Imagine an Aboriginal
nation involved in negotiations with the Crown over access and control
of certain territory. Imagine further that Canadian law holds that (a) the
nation in question enjoys Aboriginal title to such territory; (b)
Aboriginal title confers exclusive rights on the nation to a wide range of
activities on the territory, including exclusive rights to extract and
develop surface and subsurface, and renewable and non-renewable,
resources; (c) the Crown possesses no proprietary authority with respect
to the territory in question; and (d) any existing third-party interests are
subject to the exercise of rights associated with Aboriginal title.
Contrast this with the more likely scenario that (a) the law has not yet
recognized that the nation in question possesses title to anything more
than a few scattered villages within the territory in question; (b) legal
recognition of Aboriginal title only authorizes the Aboriginal nation to
engage in pre-contact practices integral to their distinctive identity; (c)
the law views the remainder of the territory as "Crown lands;" and (d)
the law recognizes and enforces rights associated with third-party
interests, such as timber rights, both on land conceived of as subject to
Aboriginal title and lands within the territory not conceived of as subject
to Aboriginal title. These two scenarios represent two different
distributions of property rights, producing two different distributions of
bargaining power and structuring two different outcomes in
negotiations. Whether the first or the second scenario exists is a
function of legal choice.
Nor was the distribution of bargaining power among the Crown
and Aboriginal nations a one-shot affair, occurring some time in the
distant past when the law initially accepted assertions of underlying
14

Restructuringthe Relationship, supra note 1, at 527-56.
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Crown sovereignty and title. The distribution of baseline entitlements is
an ongoing phenomenon, occurring and recurring every time a court
rules on the nature and extent of Aboriginal title, Crown title, and thirdparty interests. Indeed, legal framing of disputes between Aboriginal
people and the Crown-what makes a political dispute a legal disputesignals the distributive function of the legal system. Public highways are
characterized as running through "Crown land," with the question being
whether an Aboriginal person possesses certain "rights of access." Fee
simple interests are characterized as stable, durable, and exclusionary,
and paramount in the event of conflict with a right associated with
Aboriginal title. Aboriginal title is characterized as sui generis, disabling
Aboriginal litigants from accessing effective interim relief measures
available to property right-holders.
Thus, it is not a question of whether the law ought to become
involved in nation-to-nation negotiations to categorize territory for the
purpose of recognizing Aboriginal and Crown rights; Canadian law is
already involved in the categorization of territory by establishing and
maintaining baselines, in the form of rights associated with legislative
power and property entitlements, from which parties exercise their
relative power and rights. To speak of law as too blunt an instrument to
resolve the complex and competing interests implicated in the protection
of Aboriginal lands and resources ignores the fact that the law is already
there--establishing baselines, defining rights, forming and maintaining a
range of interests at stake, and actively constituting the relative power of
the parties. Instead of whether the law should intervene, this narrative
asks on whose behalf should the law intervene. To those who believe
that the law aspires to distributive justice, the answer is clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Commission's narrative locates the law of Aboriginal
title in initially informal inter-societal norms that have enabled the
mutual coexistence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people on the
continent, the counter-narrative sees the development of inter-societal
norms occurring within the context of a colonial legal imagination that
accepted unjust claims of undifferentiated Crown sovereignty and
underlying title. Legal acceptance of such claims has skewed the
distribution of power between Aboriginal nations and the Canadian
state in such a way that leaves Aboriginal nations severely
disadvantaged, in fact and law, in their attempts to achieve territorial
self-sufficiency. To ignore the distributive dimension of the law of
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Aboriginal title is to ignore law's participation in the dispossession and
colonization of Aboriginal people. While the Commission's narrative
calls for the adherence to norms grounded in initial relations among
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, the counter-narrative
additionally calls on law to produce just distributions of legislative and
proprietary power. While the Commission's narrative demands
relational justice, the counter-narrative demands distributive justice.
I believe the counter-narrative to be closer to the truth, but I also
believe the two possess many points of convergence. For instance, both
narratives suggest that Canada must come to terms with the fact that it
has for too long refused to fully acknowledge the parallel existence of
Aboriginal legal regimes. Viewing the law of Aboriginal title in
distributive terms does not mean conceiving of Aboriginal title as a set of
rights provided to Aboriginal people by the Canadian state; a just
distribution of property rights can and should occur through Canadian
legal recognition of Aboriginal systems of land tenure.
And so, in the end, the counter-narrative does not suggest that
governments should act any differently than in the manner proposed by
the Commission-which is why it does not conflict with, but instead
complements, the Commission's narrative. But if the Commission's
narrative relegates law to the shadows, the counter-narrative reveals that
law hides in shadows of its own making. It suggests that it is not merely
law's role but law's responsibility, borne of its relation to distributive
justice, to allocate proprietary power in ways that force governmental
action. To return to the title of this essay-with apologies to Tina
Turner-it suggests that law is much more than a second-hand emotion.

